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IN THE 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Michael W. Dennis, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an interlocutory order suppressing evidence. This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the officers exceed the permissible scope of the stop by questioning the 
driver about his earlier presence in an area frequented by drug dealers? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed 
for correctness, including its application of the law to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 
UT 95, 1 15,103 P.3d 699. The trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed 
for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11,100 P.3d 1222. 
2. Was the officer justified in conducting a roadside search of defendant's 
coin purse, where drug paraphernalia was found in the truck, defendant made 
furtive gestures in his pocket, and defendant smelled of marijuana smoke? 
Standard of Review. Same as in issue 1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was arrested and charged with (1) possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute by a restricted person, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (West 2004); (2) possession 
of marijuana with intent to distribute by a restricted person, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (West 2004); (3) unlawful 
possession of a schedule I or schedule II narcotic by a restricted person, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (West 2004); and 
(4) possession of drug paraphernalia by a restricted person, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004). R. 1-2. Defendant was 
released after posting bond, but after he failed to appear for a scheduled proceeding, 
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a bench warrant was issued for defendant's arrest. R. 10-13. Defendant moved to 
suppress the evidence seized. See R. 14-17. Following an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 14-17. Defendant filed a petition for 
interlocutory appeal and this court granted the petition. See R. 19-20,26-27; Order 
dated June 12,2006. 
B. SUMMARY OF FACTS1 
At 3:00 a.m. on October 18, 2005, Officers Trent Anderson and Lynn 
Archuletta were parked "car-to-car," facing opposite directions, at the front entrance 
of a local business in Helper City. R. 37: 4-5, 22 (R. 14). As the two officers 
conversed, Officer Anderson saw a black pickup truck slow to approximately five 
miles per hour at a stop sign down the street, then proceed through the intersection 
without stopping. R. 37: 5-6 (R. 14). As the pickup truck then proceeded past the 
officers on State Road 6 (SR6), Officer Anderson saw a crack in the windshield. R. 
37:5,22 (R. 14). Officer Archuletta had seen the truck about two hours earlier at the 
Riverside Motel— an area local police "were dealing with on an almost daily basis 
with narcotics users and dealers". R. 37: 6, 22, 31, 38-39 (R. 14). Some seventeen 
felony drug arrests had been made at that location. R. 37: 22, 31. 
The facts are taken from the suppression hearing and Officer Anderson's 
video of the stop, which was played at the suppression hearing and is part of the 
record on appeal. The video is cited with a "V" followed by the time as reflected in 
the video, e.g., V3:06:02. Parenthetical citations refer to the trial court's findings on 
the matter as set forth in its Order on Motions to Suppress, R. 14-17, a copy of which 
is included in the Addendum. 
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As Officer Anderson prepared to leave to initiate a traffic stop, Officer 
Archuletta advised him that he had seen the truck earlier at the motel. R. 37: 6 (R. 
14). Officer Anderson pulled out of the parking lot, activated his red and blue 
lights, and stopped the truck about a half mile down the road. R. 37: 6-7,12, 22; 
V3:06:02 (R. 15). He recognized both occupants in the truck: Brian Straugh, the 
driver, and defendant Mike Dennis, the passenger. R. 37: 6-7 (R. 15). Officer 
Anderson had dealt with both in the past and was aware that they had been 
involved in drugs and burglaries or thefts. R. 37: 7,18-19. 
After obtaining Straugh's driver's license, registration, and insurance 
documents, Officer Anderson returned to his patrol car. R. 37: 7,15; V3:07:40. He 
requested assistance from Officer Archuletta and attempted to run a computer 
check. R. 37: 7,23 (R. 15). Officer Archuletta arrived shortly thereafter. R. 37: 7 (R. 
15). When Officer Anderson could not establish a link on the computer, he 
requested that dispatch run the checks. R. 37:7-8,15 (R. 15). While they waited for 
dispatch to run the checks, Officer Archuletta told Officer Anderson that when he 
saw Straugh at the motel, "they were up fixing something underneath and doing 
something there at the driver's door." V3:13:42. After an eight minute wait, 
dispatch reported that the license and vehicle information was valid and that there 
were no outstanding warrants. R. 37: 7-8,15; V3:07:40-3:15:20 (R. 15). 
The two officers returned to the pickup truck, Officer Anderson approaching 
at the driver side door and Officer Archuletta approaching at the passenger side 
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door. R. 37: 7-8; V3:15:30 (R. 15).2 Officer Anderson asked Straugh about his 
activities and purpose at the Riverside Motel. R. 37:16-17; V3:15:37 (R. 15). While 
conversing with Straugh, Officer Anderson observed an unhooked stereo amplifier 
on the floor and asked Straugh what it was for. R. 37:8; v3:16:18-23. The amplifier 
raised his suspicions because both men had been involved in burglaries or thefts in 
the past and amplifiers are usually hooked up. R. 37: 9,16,20,26. 
Officer Archuletta also saw the unhooked amplifier on the floorboard. R. 37: 
25-26. But in addition, he saw some Zig-Zag rolling papers, commonly used to roll 
marijuana cigarettes, on the armrest of the driver side door. R. 37: 9,25,29,36-37. 
Officer Archuletta alerted Officer Anderson to the rolling papers. R. 37: 9,13, 29. 
When Officer Anderson looked down to see them, he also saw a tubular, bright 
green object lying underneath them, which he believed to be a "narcotic 
paraphernalia item/' R. 37: 9,26; V3:17:39 (R. 15). He asked Straugh what it was, 
indicating that " it looks like a marijuana pipe/7 V3:17:49. After a brief discussion 
about the pipe, Officer Anderson asked Straugh to step out of the vehicle so that he 
could retrieve the paraphernalia. R. 37: 9; V3:19:05 (R. 15) 
Straugh exited and walked to the back of the truck, where Officer Anderson 
frisked him for weapons. V3:19:ll-19:50. Finding no weapons, Officer Anderson 
2
 Officer Archuletta originally believed that he had approached the pickup 
truck and spoke with the occupants while Officer Anderson waited at his patrol car 
for the license and vehicle checks. R. 37: 23,29. However, after viewing the video 
tape of the incident, recorded from Officer Anderson's vehicle, he acknowledged 
that the two officers approached the vehicle together. R. 37: 35; video. 
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returned to the driver side door and, after receiving permission from Straugh, 
retrieved the rolling papers. V3:19:52, Officer Anderson then asked defendant what 
was in his black bag. V3:20:08. Defendant said he had his "money and stuff like 
that/7 V3:20:12. Apparently, he also denied having any drugs in the bag, to which 
Officer Anderson replied, "Well, let's pull the dog out and see." V3:20:16. 
Defendant responded to "pull the dog out." V3:20:18. Officer Anderson then shined 
his flashlight into the car and saw on the floorboard small plastic baggies, which are 
also common with narcotics usage. R. 37: 9; V3:20:25 (R. 15). After asking Straugh 
about the plastic baggies, Straugh retrieved them for the officer and told him they 
were for speaker parts. R. 37: 9; V3:20:25. Straugh then returned to the back of the 
truck and Officer Anderson questioned him further. V3:20:35-21:32. 
Officer Anderson returned to the driver side door of the pickup truck and 
looked inside with the aid of his flashlight. V3:21:33. Then, Officer Anderson 
engaged in a brief conversation with defendant about his connection to the 
paraphernalia and evasive behavior: 
Officer Anderson: Mike, you know what, you've been convicted of 
dope before. Okay? Don't try to fool us. 
Defendant: I ain't done nothing. That's what I'm saying. 
Officer Anderson: I've been finding all kinds of paraphernalia in 
here. 
Defendant: [unintelligible]... a ride home." 
Officer Anderson: Well, obviously, you're being evasive about 
something, Mike. 
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V3:21:42. Officer Anderson, as well as Officer Archuletta, conversed with defendant 
for a few more seconds, in which they discussed, among other things, the officer's 
belief that defendant was "involved in the game" and the presence of the "rolling 
papers/7 V3:21:56. Officer Anderson then returned to the back of the pickup truck, 
where he further questioned Straugh and even asked that he show him how he used 
the rolling papers. V3:22:23-24:12. 
Meanwhile, Officer Archuletta continued to question defendant. Defendant 
would not look at Officer Anderson when he talked to him. R. 37:10. But when 
Officer Archuletta engaged in conversation with him, defendant became defensive. 
R. 37: 10. At some point during their conversation, Officer Archuletta saw 
defendant, who was still seated in the truck, move "a black looking basket weave 
leather" object from one side of the pocket of his hoody to the other side. R. 37:24-
25 (R. 15). Knowing that defendant was a "convicted felon," and concerned that the 
black object could be a knife handle, gun handle, or a gun holster, Officer Archuletta 
asked defendant what it was, but defendant would not tell him. R. 37:24-25,28,37. 
Officer Archuletta asked defendant to take his hands out of his pocket, but again, 
defendant refused. R. 37: 24, 27-28.3 
3
 Officer Archuletta testified that officers are trained that when they suspect 
someone is armed, the first thing they should do is to instruct the suspect to show 
his or her hands, not ask if they have a weapon. R. 37: 28. 
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Officer Anderson returned to the driver side door. V3:24:10. Officer 
Archuletta asked defendant to "prove me wrong/7 V3:24:17. Officer Anderson 
asked defendant whether he had any weapons on him. V3:24:19. Officer Archuletta 
then asked defendant to exit the pickup truck so that he could search him for 
weapons and Officer Anderson likewise told defendant to "come on out/7 R. 37: 9, 
24,39; V3:24:21. Because the passenger side door would not open, defendant exited 
through the driver side door and was escorted to the rear of the vehicle next to 
Straugh. R. 37: 9-10; V3:24:33. 
As defendant walked back to the rear of the truck, he placed his hand back 
into his pocket. R. 37:10; V3:24:39. Officer Anderson told defendant three times to 
take his hand out of his pocket before he removed his hand. R. 37: 10; V3:24:40. 
Officer Anderson then asked him to place his hands behind his back so he could 
"pat him down" for weapons. R. 37:10. As he patted him down, Officer Anderson 
could smell "a real pugnant odor of marijuana" on defendant's person. R. 37: 10. 
During the pat down, Officer Archuletta removed the black object from defendant's 
pocket and discovered that it was a small black leather coin purse. R. 37: 26-27; 
V3:25:18. Officer Archuletta then opened the coin purse and discovered "some 
marijuana, some methamphetamine, and some pills." R. 37: 10-11, 26; V3:25:21. 
Officer Anderson then handcuffed defendant and a further search of his pockets 
uncovered marijuana pipes in his pockets. R. 37:11; V3:25:25. 
8 
After taking defendant into custody, the officers searched the pickup truck. 
R, 37:11. Officer Anderson retrieved the baggies on the floorboard and additional 
baggies under the "boot shifter77 of the stick shift. R. 37:11. All of the baggies were 
empty but one, which contained a large rock consistent with crystal 
methamphetamine. R. 37:11. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Scope of Detention. Defendant contends that the officers7 questioning of 
the driver and defendant was not permissible because the officers did not observe 
the paraphernalia or amplifier until after their inquiry into drugs began. Contrary 
to defendant's claim, the officers were justified in questioning the men about drug 
use. The officers knew both men had histories of drug involvement, the pickup 
truck they were driving was just two hours earlier in a location frequented by drug 
dealers, and the men were seen doing something at the driver's door—a place 
where drugs are often concealed. These facts supported a reasonable suspicion 
justifying the officers7 questioning the men about drugs. 
II. Coin Purse Search. Defendant also contends that the search of the coin 
purse was not justified as a weapons search. The State agrees. However, following 
the frisk, the officers had probable cause to believe that defendant was concealing 
drugs and that he was using or in possession of drugs. Mere presence in a car for 
which there is probable cause is not sufficient to justify the search of a passenger. 
However, the officers relied on more than defendant's mere presence. When the 
officers discovered that defendant had no weapons, they could reasonably infer that 
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defendant's furtive movements were an attempt to conceal drugs on his person. 
Moreover, the officer conducting the frisk smelled the odor of marijuana on 
defendant's person. These factors, together with the presence of the drug 
paraphernalia in the truck, created probable cause to believe defendant was 
concealing contraband. The officers were thus justified in extending the automobile 
search to defendant. In addition, the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant 
for drug possession or use. Because the search was contemporaneous with 
defendant's arrest, the search of the coin purse was also justified as incident to 
arrest. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE OFFICERS DID NOT EXCEED THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF 
THE DETENTION BY QUESTIONING THE DRIVER ABOUT HIS 
EARLIER PRESENCE AT AN AREA FREQUENTED BY DRUG 
DEALERS 
Defendant argues that the officers exceeded the permissible scope of the stop 
when they continued to question him and Straugh after dispatch reported that 
Straugh's driver's license was valid, his registration and insurance were current, and 
the two had no outstanding warrants. Aplt. Brf. at 10-14. He contends that rather 
than questioning the two, the officers should have permitted them "to proceed on 
their way without further questioning." Aplt. Brf. at 11-12. Contrary to defendant's 
claim, the officers did not exceed the permissible scope of the stop. 
In determining whether a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court inquires first, whether "the police officer's action [was] 
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'justified at its inception/" and second, whether "the resulting detention [was] 
'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the 
first place/" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1131-32 (Utah 1994) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1,19-20 (1968)). In this case, defendant has not challenged the officer's 
action in stopping defendant, nor could he. See Aplt. Brf. at 10-17. Officer 
Archuletta saw defendant drive through an intersection without stopping at the 
stop sign. R. 37: 5-6 (R. 14). As held in Lopez, "[a]n observed traffic violation gives 
the officer 'at the least, probable cause to believe the citizen had committed a traffic 
offense/" 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879,882 n.2 (Utah App. 
1989)). The only question on appeal, therefore, is whether the ensuing detention 
was justified. The district court correctly ruled that it was. 
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop/" Id. (quoting Florida 
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,500 (1983)). In conducting a traffic stop, officers "may request 
a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a 
citation." Id. But "[o]nce the purpose of the initial stop is concluded,... the person 
must be allowed to depart." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT125, \ 31,63 P.3d 650. Further 
questioning is not justified "unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable 
suspicion of a further illegality." Id. The officers had that here. 
Upon returning to the pickup truck, Officer Anderson questioned Straugh 
about his presence at the Riverside Motel parking lot. R. 37:16-17; V3:15:37 (R.15). 
This questioning was supported by several factors which, when viewed together, 
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created reasonable suspicion that Straugh and defendant may have been involved in 
a theft or burglary or some kind of drug transaction. First, both officers were aware 
of the two men's prior involvement with drugs and thefts. R. 37: 7, 18-19, 23. 
Officer Anderson had "dealt" with both men in the past and "kn[ew] them to be 
into narcotics and into burglaries" or thefts. R. 37:7,18-19.4 Officer Archuletta was 
likewise aware of their criminal histories involving "[n]arcotics, burglaries, [and] 
thefts." R. 37:23. Second, the two men were seen earlier at the Riverside Motel—an 
"area, at the time, [officers] were dealing with on an almost daily basis with 
narcotics users and dealers." R. 37: 6. Third, defendant was evasive with Officer 
Anderson when he first talked to them after making the stop. Defendant "wouldn't 
even look at [Officer Anderson] when [he] was talking to him." R. 37:10; V3:12:42. 
And fourth, Officer Archuletta had seen them earlier "doing something there at the 
driver's door." V3:13:42. This was a significant factor because drugs are often 
concealed in car doors. See Bustamante v. State, 917 S.W.2d 144,145 (Tex. App. 1996) 
(observing that "[t]he two officers knew from their experience and intelligence 
reports that a car door is a place commonly used to conceal contraband"); People v. 
Olivas, 859 P.2d 211, 216 (Colo. 1993) (observing that "[a]n experienced law 
enforcement officer might reasonably believe that the area behind a loose door panel 
From Officer Anderson's testimony at the suppression hearing, it appears 
that he was aware of the thefts or burglaries only through past criminal histories. 
SeeR. 37:17-19. 
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is a likely place to hide contraband while it is being transported on interstate 
highways"). 
The foregoing factors, viewed separately, would not create reasonable 
suspicion. However, as recently reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court, "courts may 
not use a 'divide-and-conquer analysis/ In other words, courts cannot evaluate 
individual facts in isolation to determine whether each fact has an innocent 
explanation/' State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, f 14, 563 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22)). Instead, "courts must look to the 'totality of the 
circumstances' to determine whether, taken together, the facts warranted further 
investigation by the police officer.'7 Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 
274 (2002). 
Nor may courts insist that the facts and circumstances conclusively 
demonstrate that criminal conduct is in fact occurring or about to occur. "[PJrobable 
cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an 
actual showing of such activity." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,243,245 (1983). The 
likelihood of criminal activity is even less in the case of reasonable suspicion, "and it 
falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.'" Id. 
Alverez, 2006 UT 61, \ 14 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). Accordingly, "[a] 
determination that reasonable suspicion exists... need not rule out the possibility of 
innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. Indeed, "innocent behavior frequently 
will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
243,245 n.13 (1983), and, of course, reasonable suspicion as well. All that is required 
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is that the officer's suspicion be "supported by specific and articulable facts as well 
as any rational inferences drawn from those facts/7 Alverez, 2006 UT 61, % 14. 
As demonstrated above, the facts and inferences drawn from those facts 
supported such a suspicion. While the conduct and activity of defendant and 
Straugh might have been innocent, the converging circumstances and their conduct, 
when viewed together, "warranted further investigation" by Officer Anderson. Id. 
The questioning of the men in Terry v. Ohio was based on less. The officer in 
Terry observed two men standing at the corner of a downtown intersection at 2:30 in 
the afternoon. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5. One of the men walked down the sidewalk past 
some stores, then paused for a moment to look into a store window, before 
proceeding a short distance farther. Id. at 6. The man then turned around, looked 
briefly in the store window again, and rejoined his companion at the corner. Id. 
After the two men briefly conversed, the other man followed the same ritual. Id. 
Each of the men repeated this conduct five to six times. Id. Although the officer had 
no information about the individuals, and observed them do nothing wrong, the 
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the officer was warranted in stopping to 
question the men. Id. at 27-28. Observed the Court, "It would have been poor police 
work indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from 
stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further." 
Id. at 23. 
Likewise, it would have been poor police work indeed for Officers Anderson 
and Archuletta to have failed to investigate defendant and Straugh further for drug 
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involvement Both were known to be involved in drugs, they were seen at an area 
where drug activity was a real problem, and they were seen doing something at the 
driver's door—a place where drugs are often concealed. Given these facts, the 
officers questioning was not based on "an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion 
or hunch/" but rather on specific and articulable facts. See Alverez, 2006 UT 61, \ 14. 
Defendant argues that the officers were not justified in relying on past 
criminal histories of drugs and theft or burglary to support their suspicion and cites 
rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence, as support. Aplt. Brf. at 13. However, rule 404 
applies to actions and proceedings in the courts, not to an officer's analysis of facts 
on the scene. See Utah R. Evid. 1101(a).5 Utah courts have questioned whether a 
defendant's criminal history may be considered in assessing probable cause. See 
State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Ranquist, 2005 UT App 
482,1 8 n.2,128 P.3d 1201. Those cases, however, should be overruled. 
As observed by the Tenth Circuit, "[t]o be sure, . . . a prior criminal history is 
by itself insufficient to create reasonable suspicion." United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 
1120,1132 (10th Cir. 2005). However, "in conjunction with other factors, criminal 
history contributes powerfully to the reasonable suspicion calculus." Id.; accord 
United States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106,1114 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that "criminal 
history, combined with other factors, can support a finding of reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause"). Other courts have likewise recognized that criminal history is 
5
 Rule 1101 also specifically provides that the rules of evidence do not apply 
to search warrants. Utah R. Evid. 1101(b). 
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an appropriate factor in assessing reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See, e.g., 
United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that suspect's "prior 
criminal activity or record clearly is material to the probable cause determination"); 
United States v. Taylor, 985 R2d 3,6 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Sumpter, 669 
R2d 1215, 1222 (8th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that "an individuals' prior criminal 
activities and record have a bearing on the probable cause determination"). The 
United States Supreme Court has also suggested that criminal history is a relevant 
and permissible consideration in assessing reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 4A4L U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (rejecting claim that officers had basis to conduct a 
weapons frisk where officers "neither recognized [defendant] as a person with a 
criminal history nor had any particular reason to believe that he might be inclined to 
assault them" and did not see him give any "indication of possessing a weapon"). 
Citing State v. Alexander, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), defendant also 
contends that his nervous conduct should be given no weight. Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. 
While nervousness alone is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause, State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137,143 (Utah App. 1997), it is a factor to 
be considered with other factors. See Alverez, 2006 UT 61, 1 23 (considering 
defendant's nervousness in determining whether there was probable cause to 
believe he had drugs in his mouth). In any event, defendant was not merely 
nervous, but evasive. The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly recognized that 
"nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable 
suspicion." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,124 (2000). 
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Defendant also contends that the pickup's location in an area frequently used 
to transact drug deals is not a factor. Aplt Brf. at 13. Again, defendant's claim is 
contrary to Supreme Court precedent. As observed in Illinois v. Wardlow, "officers 
are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining 
whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 
investigation." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. The Court in Wardlow thus relied on the 
defendant's presence "in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking," together with his 
flight upon seeing the officers, in concluding that reasonable suspicion existed to 
stop the defendant for questioning. Id. at 124-26. 
Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in relying on the officer's 
observation of the unhooked amplifier, rolling papers, plastic baggies, and 
marijuana pipe, because those items were not observed until after Officer Anderson 
began questioning Straugh about his presence at the Riverside Motel. Aplt. Brf. at 
14. He also challenges the trial court's finding that these items were found less than 
two minutes from the time dispatch verified the license and registration 
information. Aplt. Brf. at 15. These complaints, however, are irrelevant because 
Officer Anderson's questioning was already supported by reasonable suspicion. 
Indeed, these additional observations added to his suspicion, creating the probable 
cause necessary to justify a search of the car. See, e.g., State v. May cock, 947 P.2d 695 
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(Utah App. 1997) (finding probable cause to search car based on officer's 
observation of clip, pipe, and marijuana smell).6 
II. THE OFFICER'S ROADSIDE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S COIN 
PURSE WAS SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE THAT HE 
PERSONALLY POSSESSED DRUGS 
In his final argument, defendant contends that Officer Archuletta was not 
justified in opening his coin purse after discovering it in his jacket during the 
weapons frisk. Because Officer Archuletta testified that he had no basis to believe a 
weapon was contained in the purse, R. 37: 41-42, the State agrees that he was not 
justified in opening the purse pursuant to a Terry frisk for weapons. However, 
contrary to defendant's claim, the officers had probable cause to believe defendant 
had contraband in the purse at the time they opened the coin purse. 
The law is well settled that "a person's mere propinquity to others 
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to 
probable cause to search that person/' Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added); 
6
 In any event, the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. As 
defendant acknowledges, following the license and registration verification, Officer 
Anderson began questioning Straugh at approximately 3:15:35 a.m. Aplt. Brf. at 15. 
Officer Anderson mentions the amplifier less than a minute later. See v3:16:18-23. 
He mentions the rolling papers at 3:17:49 a.m, two minutes and 14 seconds after 
initiation of the conversation. v3:17:49. However, Officer Anderson began looking 
in the armrest area of the driver side door some 19 seconds earlier, and is clearly 
seen looking at the armrest seven seconds earlier. See V3:17:30. Where Officer 
Archuletta testified that he saw the rolling papers first and alerted Officer Anderson 
of their presence, the trial court could reasonably find that the rolling papers were in 
fact observed in less than two minutes. 
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accord United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,587 (1948) ("We are not convinced that a 
person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his 
person to which he would otherwise be entitled/'). But the officers here had more. 
In addition to the evidence of drug use in the pickup truck and defendant's drug 
past, defendant had made furtive movements while talking to Officer Archuletta. 
Defendant moved "a black looking basket weave leather" object from one side of the 
pocket of his hoody to the other side and refused to identify what it was or remove 
his hands from his pocket. R. 37: 24-25, 27-28, 37. Although Officer Archuletta 
initially believed the object may have been a weapon, the weapons frisk revealed 
that it was not. This revelation in turn supported an inference that defendant was 
not attempting to hide a weapon, but drugs. This inference was strengthened when, 
in the course of frisking defendant, Officer Archuletta smelled "a real pugnant odor 
of marijuana" on defendant's person. R. 37:10. 
The foregoing factors created probable cause that defendant was personally 
concealing marijuana or other drugs in the coin purse. The fact that the officers may 
not have had "specific knowledge" defendant was concealing drugs "is not critical 
since 'a police officer is not required to meet any such standard of perfection as to 
demand an absolutely certain judgment before he may act.'" State v. Spurgeon, 904 
P.2d 220,227 (Utah App. 1995) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the roadside search 
of the purse was justified. Because defendant was traveling in a truck on the road, it 
was impractical and thus unnecessary for officers to secure a warrant. Accordingly, 
the exigencies of the situation justified a search under the automobile exception to 
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the warrant requirement. Cf. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93 (holding that police executing 
search warrant on tavern did not have probable cause to extend search to a tavern 
patron where patron "made no gestures indicative of criminal conduct, made no 
movements that might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, and said nothing 
of a suspicious nature to the police officers"). 
The facts also created probable cause to support defendant's arrest for 
possession or use of marijuana. He smelled of marijuana and a marijuana pipe and 
rolling papers were found in the vehicle. See Syurgeon, 904 P.2d at 227 (recognizing 
that "'probable cause for arrest may arise from an officer's sense of smell7"). 
Although the pipe and rolling papers may very well have belonged to Straugh, the 
odor of marijuana on defendant, together with his furtive gestures, strongly 
suggests that he was using marijuana with Straugh. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
2(1)(ee) (West 2004) (defining "possession" or "use" as "the joint or individual 
. . . control. . . , inhalation,... or consumption" of drugs). As observed in Wyoming 
v. Houghton, "a car passenger... will often be engaged in a common enterprise with 
the driver." 526 U.S. 295, 304 (1999). 
The trial court thus correctly ruled that the search of the coin purse was 
justified as incident to arrest. The arrest was supported by probable cause, the coin 
purse was within defendant's "immediate control," and "the search [was] 
conducted contemporaneously to the arrest." State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114,1117-18 
(Utah App. 1997). Although the search preceded the arrest, the contemporaneous 
requirement is satisfied if the search immediately precedes the arrest "and probable 
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cause to effect the arrest . . . exist[s] 'independent of the evidence seized in the 
search/" State v. Amirkhizi, 2004 UT App 324, f 19,100 P.3d 225. As discussed 
above, those requirements were met 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18, f 10,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between 
the litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. ofCal, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,560 
(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided 
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
Respectfully submitted December 21, 2006. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
S. Gray 
fssistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
MICHEL W.DENNIS, 
BRIAN GABRIEL STRAUGH 
Plaintiff, ; 
Defendant. ] 
i ORDER ON MOTIONS TO 
) SUPPRESS 
> 213-10-05 & 212-10-05 
i Criminal No. 051700285 
} Criminal No. 051700283 
Defendant Straugh moved to suppress evidence by a Motion dated February 14, 
2006. The cases on defendant Straugh and defendant Dennis, though charged in 
separate criminal Informations, arise out of the same traffic stop. Defendant Dennis joined 
in the Motion to Suppress filed by defendant Straugh, and a Suppression Hearing was 
conducted on March 20, 2006. Officers Trent Anderson and Lynn Archuleta of the Helper 
City Police Department testified at the hearing. The Court, having heard the evidence and 
the arguments of counsel, now finds as follows: 
On October 18, 2005, at approximately 3:00 a.m. Officer Trent Anderson and 
Officer Lynn Archuleta of the Helper City Police Department were on duty and were parked 
along SR6 with the driver's side doors next to one another. Officer Anderson observed a 
black pick up truck approaching a stop sign on a street which enters SR6. Officer 
Anderson noticed that the vehicle did not stop for the stop sign. As the truck passed the 
location of the officers, Officer Anderson noticed that the vehicle had a cracked windshield. 
Officer Archuleta commented to Officer Anderson that Archuleta had seen the truck earlier 
at the Riverside Motel, a location known for unlawful drug activity. 
'epDIWTWIB 
Officer Anderson stopped the truck. He approached the vehicle and found the 
driver to be defendant Brian Straugh. The only other occupant of the vehicle was 
defendant Michael Dennis. While speaking with Straugh, Officer Anderson detected 
extreme nervousness coming from both subjects. Officer Anderson knew both subjects 
and had prior knowledge that both had been involved with burglaries, thefts, or narcotic 
violations. 
Officer Anderson returned to his patrol vehicle to run a license check on Straugh. 
Officer Anderson was unable to run the check through the Helper Police Department 
because of difficulties with the computer equipment, so he ran the check through Carbon 
County Dispatch. Dispatch was slow responding, and roughly eight (8) minutes passed 
until Officer Anderson received information from Dispatch that Straugh's license was valid. 
During this time, Officer Archuleta had responded to the scene and had proceeded to 
Officer Anderson's vehicle. 
Immediately upon receiving the license information from Dispatch, both Officers 
approached the truck. Officer Anderson asked Straugh if Straugh had been at the 
Riverside Motel. Officer Archuleta observed zig zag rolling papers in the driver's door 
handle and alerted Officer Anderson. Officer Anderson then saw the papers and also a 
green tubular object underneath the papers which appeared to be drug paraphernalia. The 
Officers also inquired about an amplifier which was loose on the floor of the vehicle. While 
Officer Anderson was speaking with Straugh, Officer Archuleta noticed that Dennis had a 
black object with a basket weave pattern which Dennis was attempting to conceal in the 
front pocket of a sweatshirt Dennis was wearing. Dennis and Straugh were removed from 
the vehicle. Officer Anderson then observed two (2) plastic baggies commonly used to 
store narcotics on the floorboard of the vehicle. Dennis was uncooperative about revealing 
the black object. Officer Anderson attempted to pat down Dennis. When Dennis 
attempted to pull away, Officer Archuleta grabbed the item from his pocket. The object 
was a coin purse. Officer Archuleta opened the purse and discovered baggies of 
suspected methamphetamine and other contraband. 
The video tape from Officer Anderson's patrol vehicle was played during the 
Suppression Hearing. The Court took note of times shown on the video. Less than two (2) 
minutes elapsed from the time that the Officers received the license response from 
dispatch until the Officers noticed in plain view the zig zag papers, green paraphernalia, 
and the amplifier. 
Based on the aforesaid findings, the Court concludes that Officer Anderson had a 
valid reason to make the traffic stop. The delay of roughly eight (8) minutes while Officer 
Anderson did a standard driver's license check with Dispatch was not improper. When 
Officer Anderson approached the truck for the second time together with Officer Archuleta, 
Officer Anderson immediately asked Straugh about being at the Riverside Motel. This 
was an improper question and not related to the traffic stop, but Straugh had no need to 
answer the question. The Officers had legitimate factors at this juncture for reasonable 
suspicion, namely that it was 3:00 in the morning, that they knew the subjects and that the 
subjects had criminal histories, that the subjects had been at the Riverside Motel, and that 
the subjects were acting nervous. These factors, while being reasons for suspicion, carry 
minimal weight. However, the Officers were certainly justified in inquiring about the loose 
amplifier based on their knowledge of the defendants' backgrounds, the fact that the 
amplifier was not hooked up, and the time of day. Additionally, the Officers also saw the 
zig zag papers and the green paraphernalia. 
The detention of the subjects was less than two (2) minutes before the Officers had 
their reasonable suspicions aroused by the amplifier, the zig zag papers, the green 
paraphernalia, and loose baggies on the floor of the vehicle. This brief detention of the 
subjects was not an unreasonable extension of time beyond the time needed for issuance 
of a traffic citation. 
As to the black coin purse in the possession of Dennis, a reasonable, objective 
officer would have been justified in pursuing what was in Dennis's sweatshirt pouch. The 
black, basket weave object was not unlike the handle of a gun, the handle of a knife, or a 
holster for a gun or knife. It was reasonable for Officer Archuleta to insist that the purse be 
taken from the sweatshirt pouch. 
It was unnecessary for the Officers to secure a Search Warrant to open the purse, 
since it was apparent from the evidence that the subjects were going to jail and the 
contents of the purse would be discovered either through an inventory or through inevitable 
discovery. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motions to 
Suppress are denied and any contraband found in the vehicle or on defendant Dennis is 
admissible at trial. j 
DATED this j j ^ d a y of April, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
